with C. Trinn (Heidelberg University)
Scholars debate whether self-rule is conducive to intrastate violence or peace. We argue that to resolve this problem the entire institutional setup of the state must be taken into account. Whereas the centripetalist view deemphasizes self-rule as a vehicle of interethnic competition, consociationalism holds that it is the interplay of accommodative institutions, with segmental autonomy among them, that promotes intrastate peace. We test the rivaling expectations on a set of 556 subnational cases in 21 culturally fractionalized post-war anocracies. We conduct a configurational risk analysis, which allows us to study self-rule and conflict risk under various institutional arrangements. We find that the full consociational ‘package’ is indeed associated with a reduction of intrastate conflict risk. However, majoritarian configurations are equally associated with a risk reduction. In contrast, models that include self-rule alone, or in combination with few other consociational elements, are consistently associated with an increase of conflict risk.
with G. Carolan (Dublin University)
Territorial power-sharing remains a persistent feature of contemporary conflict resolution. Between 1990 and 2018, as many as 228 peace agreements with territorial power-sharing provisions were signed – a figure which averages more than eight agreements per year. Existing research has identified a number of factors that impact the sustainability of such arrangements, including previous levels of violence, the level of economic development in a given territory, and the strategic importance thereof. We posit, however, that the manner in which territorial power-sharing is legally prescribed has an impact on agreement stability. To test this hypothesis, we use a qualitative content analysis based on Abbott et al’s theory of legalization to screen all 228 peace agreements with territorial power-sharing provisions in the PA-X database. We then use regression analyses to gauge social stress levels in the relevant regions vis-à-vis conflict event data drawn from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project. We argue that highly legalized power-sharing provisions have a positive effect on post-conflict autonomy success.
with C. Trinn (Heidelberg University)
The high degree of conceptual confusion in the field of territorial self-governance constitutes a major obstacle to robust findings. Based on a parsimonious definition involving three individually necessary and jointly sufficient criteria (constitutional protection, territorial quality,and strength of self-rule), we develop a new typology of territorial self-governancethat carves out subnational differences in kind. Empirically, we take a fresh look at territorial self-governance in more than2,200 second-level regions in 96 Western and non-Western democracies, semi-democracies,and a selection of autocratic regimes between 2000 and 2018. The TERRGO dataset introduced in this article contains over39,000 region-year assessments. Based on the identification of eight specific types of territorial self-governance, TERRGO allows to untangle country-specific profiles. The dataset can be used to analyze changes and asymmetries of state architectures. The framework reduces the conceptual complexity and enhances our grasp on the empirical complexity of territorial state structures.
Bringing together comparative politics, conflict research and social psychology, this book presents a novel theory to explain the consolidation outcomes of post-conflict autonomy arrangements. It builds on Social Identity Theory and identifies a successful process of ethnic recognition as the key prerequisite for peaceful interethnic cohabitation through territorial self-governance. As this process is highly context-dependent, the study identifies relevant structural and actor-centered factors and analyzes their occurrence in the consolidation periods of nineteen autonomy arrangements worldwide using Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA). The author concludes that elites accept autonomy reforms if they promise a high degree of self-determination and, at the same time, ethnic recognition is not hindered by horizontal inequalities. Bargaining efforts succeed within inclusive institutions involving non-nationalist parties and international organizations. Autonomy reforms fail if the degree of self-rule offered is too low and strong inequalities generate new grievances. Autocratic rule, nationalist parties, and a lack of international attention provide a breeding ground for further centrifugal activities. In-depth case studies on South Tyrol and the Chittagong Hill Tracts provide further evidence for the theoretical models.